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I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 41 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code Annotated
§ 72-2-2.
II.

CERTIFIED QUESTION OF LAW

The Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins has certified the following
questions of law pursuant to Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
1.

What is the burden of proof necessary to establish waiver

under Utah law?
a.

Is there one standard generally applicable to all situa-

tions involving waiver?
b.

Are there two different applicable standards depending

on whether waiver is alleged from a party's action or conduct, or
a party's inaction or silence?
1.

Where waiver is alleged from a party1s action or

conduct, must the action or conduct of that party
unequivocally show an intent to waive o£ at least be
inconsistent with any other intent?
2.

Where waiver is alleged from a party's silence or

failure to act, must the silence or failure to act on
the part of that party be unequivocal and inconsistent
with any other intent?
-1-

2.

Were the jury instructions given in the instant case consis-

tent with Utah law on the law of waiver?
3.

Were the special interrogatories asked in the instant case

consistent with Utah law on the law of waiver?
III.

NATURE OF THE CASE

The case from which these questions of law arise was initiated as a consolidated proceeding in the Third District Court,
Summit County, State of Utah.

Judge Ernest Baldwin was called

out of retirement to preside over the jury trial in May 1988.

At

the close of evidence the jury was instructed and then asked to
respond to 52 Special Interrogatories.

Based on the jury's

answers to these Special Interrogatories, Judge Baldwin entered
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, attached as Appendix A,
and Order, Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, attached as
Appendix B, both dated April 18, 1989.

Immediately thereafter

the parties filed numerous post-trial motions under Rules 50, 52,
59 and 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but before these
motions could be heard, one of the parties, Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Association, was placed into receivership under the
direction of the Resolution Trust Corporation, which then removed
the case to the United States District Court, District of Utah,
Central Division, pursuant to Federal statute.

-2-

The post-trial motions filed in Judge Baldwin's court have
not yet been decided and, in part, hinge on a determination of
the questions of law set forth above.
To set these questions of law in their proper factual context, the following facts are provided:
In 1983, Soters, Inc. ("Soters"), a Utah corporation, hired
Tri-K Contractors ("Tri-K"), a Utah construction company, to
build a condominium project at Summit Park, just off Interstate
80 in Summit County, Utah.

The construction project was ini-

tially financed by Zions Bank, however, it became necessary in
the spring of 1984, after construction was underway, to refinance
the construction loan.

Pre-Trial Order at 14.

Soters approached Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Association
("Deseret Federal") which agreed to provide a construction loan
that would pay off the earlier Zions loan and provide funds for
completion.

Before Deseret Federal would make the loan it

required certain things of Soters and Soter's contractor Tri-K in
addition to the customary loan agreement, promissory note and
trust deeds between Soters and Deseret Federal.

Of material

interest to the questions presented here, Deseret Federal
required Soters to execute a formal written construction agreement with Tri-K.

Testimony of Tri-K's attorney, Stanley Stoll,

RT 159:19-161:6, 5/12/88.

Even though the project was underway,
-3-

no formal typed construction contract with a firm completion date
had yet been signed.

Stoll, RT 156:3-6, 5/12/88.

Deseret Fed-

eral also required Tri-K to obtain a performance bond naming
Soters and Deseret Federal as dual obligees.

Testimony of Ronald

Frandsen, RT 128:8-14, 5/19/88.
On or about April 4, 1984, Soters and Tri-K entered into an
AIA Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor
("Construction Agreement) in which Tri-K agreed to construct the
condominiums for approximately $2.8 million.-

One of Tri-Kfs

principals, Sherwin Knudsen, had attorney Stanley Stoll prepare
the standard form Construction Agreement typing in a firm project
completion date of December 31, 1984.
5/12/88.

Stoll, RT 152:13-158:14,

Knudsen then presented the Construction Agreement to

its surety, United Pacific Insurance Company, which issued a performance bond on April 4, 1984, naming Soters and Deseret Federal
as dual obligees.

Pre-Trial Order at 15.

Soters assigned the

Deseret Federal agreed to loan $3 million under a separate
Construction Loan Agreement with Soters. From the loan proceeds $2,554,850 was to be used for construction costs,
including pay-off of existing indebtedness to Zions. The
difference between the $2.8 million in the Soters/Tri-K Construction Agreement and the $2.55 million devoted to construction costs in the Construction Loan Agreement represented Tri-K's profit which it agreed to take out of any
proceeds from the eventual sale of the condominiums. Findings of Fact at 15, reproduced as Appendix "A".

-4-

Construction Agreement to Deseret Federal as additional security
for the loan.
On December 31, 1984, the project was not substantially completed as required under the terms of Tri-K's Construction Agreement.

Findings of Fact 11 52.

An architect's report introduced

at trial estimated that the project was only 55% completed.

One

of the many issues at trial was whether Tri-K had breached its
Construction Agreement by failing to complete the project by the
contract completion date and whether Soters or Deseret Federal
had waived or extended the date.

The waiver defense of Tri-K and

United Pacific centered around the interpretation of certain
events that transpired in the early months of 1985.
Deseret Federal had participated the construction loan with
Continental Federal Savings Bank in Virginia.

Continental had

been claiming throughout the latter part of 1984 that the loan
was out of balance; that is, the balance of undisbursed loan proceeds was calculated to be insufficient to complete the project.
By the end of 1984, Deseret Federal reached the same conclusion
and so notified its borrower Soters that because the loan was out
of balance no more funds would be disbursed.

On January 11,

1985, Tri-K submitted its draw request for the work it had completed in December 1984.

Deseret Federal paid this draw on Feb-

ruary 7, 1985, but thereafter made no further disbursements from
-5-

the construction loan.

Findings of Fact H41; Pre-Trial Order at

14-15.
During the first months of 1985, several meetings were held
in Salt Lake City to find a solution to the problems that had
arisen because Tri-K had not completed the project on time and
the loan was out of balance.

In attendance were Sherwin Knudsen

of Tri-K, Greg Soter, of Soters, Inc., Soter's attorney, Stanley
Stoll, Deseret Federal's attorney, David Redd, and two representatives of Deseret Federal, Ron Frandsen, Major Loan Department
Manager, and Steven Anderson, the head of Deseret Federal's
appraisal and construction lending departments.

Both Stoll and

Redd testified at trial that during these meetings, Deseret Federal presented Greg Soter with an ultimatum that unless Soters
brought the loan back into balance by contributing its own funds
to make up the shortfall, Deseret Federal would not make any further disbursements.

Sherwin Knudsen acknowledged that he was

aware of Deseret Federal's position as a result of these meetings.

Knudsen was also confronted with the fact that the project

had not been completed by December 31st.

Ron Frandsen expressed

concern in one of these meetings that Tri-K had not completed the
project in time for marketing the condominiums during the '84-'85
ski season.

Knudsen estimated that he believed the project could

still be completed within budget, but could not be completed
-6-

until the fall of 1985.

Testimony of Ron Frandsen, RT

156:10-159:17, 5/19/88; Testimony of Stanley Stoll, RT
25:20 34:22, 5/12/88; Testimony of Sherwin Knudsen, RT 77,
5/16/88.
There was no evidence presented at trial that anyone from
Deseret Federal or Soters ever told Tri-K in any of these meetings, or at any other time, that it was in breach of its Construction Agreement for failure to complete the project by December 31, 1984.

There was also no evidence that anyone from

Deseret Federal or Soters ever told Tri-K that it was not
expected to adhere to its contractual completion date, or that
Deseret Federal or Soter's was expressly waiving its right under
the Construction Agreement to have the project completed by
December 31, 1984.
During January through about mid April 1985, while these
meetings were taking place, Tri-K remained on the job and submitted monthly draw requests to Deseret Federal which were never
paid.

In April, Tri-K walked off the job and subsequently filed

a mechanics1 lien against the property.

In June 1985, Deseret

Federal gave written notice to Tri-K's surety, United Pacific,
that Tri-K had not completed the project on time and was in
breach.

United Pacific never responded in any fashion to Deseret

-7-

Federal's notice.

Testimony of Ron Frandsen, RT 160:8-161:6,

5/19/88.
One of the issues sent to the jury was whether Deseret Federal had waived Tri-K's December 31, 1984 completion date, thus
relieving both Tri-K and United Pacific of any liability.
At trial the jury was first instructed on the law of waiver
by Instruction No. 18 which read:
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a
known right. To constitute a waiver, there must be an
existing right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of
its existence, and an intention to relinquish it. To
constitute waiver, one's actions or conduct must be
distinctly made, must clearly display in some unequivocal manner any intent to waive, and must be inconsistent with any other intent.
Neither Tri-K nor United Pacific's attorneys objected to the
instruction.

RT 20-23, Objections to Jury Interrogatories and

Special Verdict, 5/26/88.
The issue of Deseret Federal's waiver of the December 31,
1984 completion date was then submitted to the jury by special
interrogatories.

Special Interrogatories 22-24, patterned after

the language in Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430 (Utah 1983),
sought to determine whether Tri-K had met its burden of proving
waiver and read as follows:
22. Has Tri-K established by a preponderance of
the evidence that Deseret Federal acted in such a manner as to distinctly relinquish the right under the
Construction Contract to have the Camelot Condominium
Project completed on or before December 31, 1984?
-8-

X

Yes

No

23. Has Tri-K established by a preponderance of
the evidence that Deseret Federal clearly displayed in
some unequivocal manner an intent to relinquish the
right under the Construction Contract to have the
Camelot Condominium Project completed on or before
December 31, 1984?
X

Yes

No

24. Has Tri-K established by a preponderance of
the evidence that any evidence of an intent by Deseret
Federal to relinquish the right under the Construction
Contract to have the Camelot Condominium Project completed on or before December 31, 1984, was inconsistent
with any other intent?
Yes

X

No

Because the jury answered "No" to no. 24, Judge Baldwin concluded that Tri-K had not met its burden.

Consequently, judgment

was made in favor of Deseret Federal and against Tri-K and United
Pacific, jointly and severally, in an amount equivalent to the
costs to complete the project.
15-16.

Findings of Fact No. 54, 56 at

Judgment 11 7 at 5.

Tri-K did not contend that it was entitled to payment for
its January-April 1985, work by virtue of its Construction Agreement.

Rather, it claimed that Deseret Federal, by its represen-

tations to Sherwin Knudsen, fraudulently induced Tri-K to stay on
the project from January-April 1985, knowing that Tri-K would not
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be paid.-

United Pacific and Tri-K have argued in support of

their post-trial motions that this fraud was the "other intent"
that the jury was referring to when it answered "No" to Special
Interrogatory No. 24 ("inconsistent with any other intent than an
intent to waive") and that an intention to commit fraud does not
mutually exclude an intent to waive the completion date.

More-

over, United Pacific and Tri-K contend that Jury Instruction No.
18 and Special Interrogatory 24 misstated the law by requiring
the jury to find that Deseret Federal's conduct purportedly

man-

ifesting waiver was inconsistent with any other intent.
Deseret Federal, on the other hand, contends that the jury
understood and believed that Deseret Federal intended to hold
Tri-K liable for its prior breach but that the meetings involving
Greg Soter and Sherwin Knudsen subsequent to the December 1985,
completion date were an attempt to mitigate all of the problems
associated with the project before resorting to litigation, and
that Deseret Federal's encouragement to Greg Soter and Knudsen
during those meetings, not to abandon the project, was consistent

1/

The jury found for Tri-K on its fraudulent inducement claim,
but Judge Baldwin took this issue from the jury on the basis
that there was insufficient evidence to support a fraud
claim. Judge Baldwin did, however, conclude that Deseret
Federal had promised to pay Tri-K for the work it performed
in January-April 1985, and was estopped to deny its obligation. Findings of Fact No. 58 at 16.
-10-

with an intent to keep the project afloat in the event the problems could be resolved, and to mitigate its damages, and not a
manifestation of an intention to relinquish its right to a December 31, 1984 completion date,

Deseret Federal also argues that

Judge Baldwin, having heard all of the evidence, including the
testimony concerning Deseret Federal's dealings with Tri-K during
the January through April period, recognized the jury's position
on the waiver issue, and found the jury's answer to Special
Interrogatory No. 24 consistent with the evidence, and that he
entered his conclusion of law accordingly.

See Findings of Fact

nos. 54, 61; Conclusion of Law no. 30.
In spite of the fact that neither United Pacific, nor Tri-K
objected at trial to Jury Instruction No. 18, or to any of the
special interrogatories, they have based their post-trial motions
under Rules 50, 52, 59, and 60, on the grounds that this jury
instruction and special interrogatory misstated the law.
Although the jury instruction and interrogatories were patterned
after the language in Hunter v. Hunter, United Pacific and Tri-K
assert that Hunter has been overruled and that Tri-K should not
have been required to prove that Deseret Federal's conduct was
inconsistent with an intent other than an intent to relinquish
its right to have the project completed by December 31, 1984.
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They argue that Tri-K, having proven that Deseret Federals conduct was distinct and unequivocal, has met its burden.
These questions of law have been certified by Judge Jenkins
because it is not clear to him what must be proved in order to
find a waiver.

In its post-trial motions United Pacific has

argued that the "inconsistent with any other intent" language in
special interrogatory no. 24, although patterned after Hunter v.
Hunter, is superfluous and not required under Utah law.

See

United Pacific's Memorandum in Support of Post-Trial Motions;
Memorandum of Deseret Federal in Opposition to Post-Trial Motions
of United Pacific and Sherwin Knudsen.

United Pacific has

repeatedly pointed to decisions of the Utah Court of Appeals
decided after Hunter to support its contention that Hunter has
been overruled.

Some of these cases state that the party's

action or conduct must unequivocally evince an intent to waive ox
must at least be inconsistent with any other intent.

See Barnes

v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); B. R. Woodward
Marketing, Inc. v. Collins Food Service, Inc., 754 P.2d 99, 101
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); but. see Webb v. ROA General, Inc., 804 P.2d
547 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (intent to waive must be shown by conduct which is unequivocal and which is inconsistent with any
other intent).

-12-

There is no decision from this Court which overrules Hunter,
In fact, all of the decisions of this Court support Hunter and
can be reconciled with it. Moreover, no Utah Court of Appeals
case cites Hunter with disapproval.

However, several Court of

Appeals, decisions starting with Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226,
1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), have failed to apply the full Hunter
standard. These decisions appear to alternately mix two separate
concepts dealing with the intent of the waiving party, leading to
the and/or language preceeding the requirement that conduct be
"inconsistent with any other intent".
IV.

ELEMENTS OF WAIVER ARE ESTABLISHED
BY ONE OP THREE STANDARDS

In answer to Judge Jenkins1 initial questions, evidence of
waiver generally takes three forms.

However, the distinction

does not run along the lines of action and conduct versus silence
or inaction.

Rather, the standard is determined by the nature of

the relinquishment, that is, whether it is express or implied, or
based on conduct amounting to an estoppel.
Where the relinquishment of a known right is expressly made,
the relinquishment must be distinct.
Where the relinquishment of a known right is implied from
some positive act, or by positive inaction, the relinquishment

-13-

must be distinct, it must be manifested in some unequivocal manner, and it must be inconsistent with any other intent.
The relinquishment of a known right may also be implied by
conduct so inconsistent with the intent to enforce the right as
to induce a reasonable belief that it has been relinquished.
The intentional relinquishment (actual or constructive) of a
known right may be implied from silence where there is knowledge
of the right and a positive duty to speak.

Mere silence, how-

ever, absent such a duty can never constitute an intentional
relinquishment of a known right.
The special interrogatories nos. 22-24 and jury instruction
no. 18 in this case, unobjected to by Tri-K and United Pacific,
and patterned after Hunter v. Hunter, accurately stated the Utah
law at the time of trial as it applied to the facts and circumstances in this case.
A.

Definition of Waiver
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known

right.

The relinquishment must be distinctly made, although it

may be express or implied.

Phoenix Ins. Co. v.. Heath, 90 Utah

187, 61 P.2d 308, 310 (1936); 92 C.J.S. Waiver at 1041; 28
Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver § 154 (1966).
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B.

Express Waiver

Waiver may be expressed formally by words or declarations,
and may arise as the result of an express agreement.

The

requirement for express waiver is that the relinquishment of a
right must be distinctly made.

92 C.J.S. Waiver at 1062. It is

not necessary that there must be unequivocal acts or conduct
evincing an intent to waive.

This seems to be implicit where the

express waiver is distinct. See Rees v. Intermountain Health
Care, 808 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1991); Wagner v. Wagner, 621 P.2d 1279,
1284 (Wash. 1980); Bartleman v. Humphrey, 441 S.W.2d 335, 343
(Mo. 1969).

None of the decisions of this Court cited in Judge

Jenkins1 certification order refers to express waiver.

Like the

present case they are all implied waiver cases.
C.

Implied Waiver

Waiver may be implied from conduct or inaction.

In either

event the relinquishment must be intentional and it must relate
to a known right.

Waiver rests and depends solely on the inten-

tion of the party against whom it is asserted.
at 1058.

92 C.J.S. Waiver

The relinquishment of a known right may be implied from

conduct or inaction where there is an actual intent to relinquish
the right; and, it may be implied from such conduct or inaction
where there is not an actual intent to relinquish but where the

-15-

waiving party so acted as to mislead the other, which warrants an
inference of the relinquishment of a known right.
1.

id.

at 1060.

Actual Intent

Because intentional relinquishment lies at the foundation of waiver, the party asserting the relinquishment must prove
intent on the part of the party holding the right.

I_d. at 1058.

While it may be said that "the question whether waiver will be
found in any particular case depends not upon the secret intention of the party against whom it is asserted, but upon the
effect which his conduct has upon the other party," B. R.
Woodward Marketing v. Collins Food, 954 P.2d at 103 (citing 28
Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver S 158 at 843 (1966)), there is no
waiver unless the waiver is so intended by one party and so
understood and accepted by the other.

28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and

Waiver § 158 at 843.
A party asserting a waiver implied from the conduct or inaction of the other party holding the right must prove that the
party holding the right actually intended to relinquish it, and
must prove that the relinquishment was manifested in some
unequivocal manner, by some distinct positive act, or by positive
inaction, which is inconsistent with the continued assertion of
the right.

92 C.J.S. Waiver at 1063, 1064; Goqlia v. Bodnar, 749

P.2d 9221, 928 (Ariz. App. 1987); American Continental Life Ins.
-16-

Co. v. Ranier Construction Co,, Inc., 607 P.2d 372, 374 (Az.
1980); Howard J. White, Inc. v. Varian Associates, 2 Cal.Rptr.
871, 875 (Cal. App. 1960); Bartleman v. Humphrey, 441 S.W.2d 335,
343 (Mo. ISM);-'
1954).

Bowman v. Webster, 269 P.2d 960, 961 (Wash.

Simply stated, where waiver is implied, the conduct or

evidence of waiver must be distinct, unequivocal, and inconsistent with any other intent.

Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430 (Utah

1983).
2.

Constructive Intent

In some circumstances, waiver may occur in the absence
of an actual intention to relinquish a right.

A relinquishment

of a known right may be manifested by conduct of the party
knowingly possessing the right, which conduct is of such a nature
as to mislead the opposite party into an honest belief that the
waiver was intended or assented to.

This conduct or action must

at least be inconsistent with any other intention than an
intention to relinquish that right.
constructive rather than actual.

In this sense the intent is

92 C.J.S. at 1060;

see Seaport

Citizens Bank v. Dippel, 735 P.2d 1047 (Idaho App. 1987);

"If [waiver] not shown by express declarations but implied
by conduct, there must be a clear, unequivocal, and decisive
act of party showing such purpose, and so consistent with
intention to waive that no other reasonable explanation is
possible" 441 S.W.2d at 343.
-17-

Wells v. Minor, 578 N.E.2d 1337, 1346 (111. App. 1991); Mahban v.
MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 691 P.2d 421, 424 (Nev. 1984); Rubin v.
Los Angeles Federal Savings & Loan, 205 Cal. Rptr. 455, 459 (Cal.
App. 4 Dist. 1984); Alford, Meroney & Company v. Rowe, 619 S.W.2d
210, 213 (Tex. App, 1981); Scott v. Federal Life Insurance
Company, 19 Cal.Rpt. 258, 262 (Cal. App. 1962); Beck v. Lind, 235
N.W.2d 239, 251 (N.D. 1975); Perlick v. Country Mutual Casualty
Co., 80 N.W.2d 921 (Wise. 1957).- 7
D.

Evidence of Waiver by Silence is the
Same as Other Implied Waiver

A waiver may be implied from the silence of the party who
has the power of waiving under circumstances which require him to
speak, but mere silence is not waiver unless there is some duty
or obligation to speak.

Plateau Mining Company v. Utah Div. of

State Lands, 802 P.2d 720, 730 (Utah 1990) (citing Dalton v.
LeBlanc, 350 F.2d 95, 98-99 (10th Cir. 1965); 92 C.J.S. Waiver at
1064; s^e also Stewart v. Casey, 595 P.2d 1176 (Mont. 1979);

1/

Many of these cases define waiver as "The intentional relinquishment of a known right, or conduct so inconsistent with
the intent to enforce the right as to induce a reasonable
belief that it has been relinquished". While this definition points to the fact that in some circumstances the
intent is constructive rather than actual it does little to
instruct the reader on the evidence required to prove the
actual intentional relinquishment where it is implied from
conduct rather than express waiver. See Alford, Meroney &
Company v. Rowe, 619 S.W.2d at 213 for one court's attempt
to define the form of evidence to fit this definition.
-18-
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lv

decided.

Additionally, on appeal Intermountain Health Care

offered an erroneous concession that express waiver requires
unequivocal conduct which is inconsistent with any other intent,
a definition which it apparently derived from implied waiver
cases decided by the Utah Court of Appeals.

The only shortcoming

in the decisions from this Court dealing with waiver has been a
failure to explain what in some cases was obvious; that the purported relinquishment of the right in each case was implied from
the party's conduct or silence, where it was claimed by the party
asserting a waiver that the relinquishing party actually intended
to relinquish his or her rights.
The recent decisions of the Utah Court of Appeals have been
much less consistent on these issues.

While none of these opin-

ions has referred to Hunter with disfavor, these decisions build
on previous decisions of the Court of Appeals rather than the
decisions of this Court, resulting in the promulgation of mixed
and alternating statements of the evidence necessary to prove
that the party holding the right intentionally relinquished it.
These cases have led to the conjunctive/disjunctive problem in
reference to the "inconsistent with any other intent" prong, that
United Pacific points to as overruling Hunter.

-20-
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ex-husband claimed that the woman impliedly waived her right to
enforce the order.

The Utah Supreme Court held that the woman

did not waive her right to enforce the child support order.
In so holding, the Hunter court stated:
With respect to waiver, this Court has previously
stated that:
'A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known
right. To constitute a waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its
existence, and an intention to relinquish it. It must
be distinctly made, although it may be express or
implied.f
American Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Blomquist, 21 Utah 2d
289, 292, 445 P.2d 1, 3 (1968) (quoting Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Heathf 90 Utah 187, 194, 61 P.2d 308,
311-12 (1936)). To constitute waiver, one's actions or
conduct must be distinctly made, must evince in some
unequivocal manner an intent to waive, and must be
inconsistent with any other intent. See id. See also,
e.g. , Waterway Terminals Co. v. P.S. Lord Mechanical
Contractors, 242 Or. 1, 406 P.2d 556 (1965); Wagner v.
Wagner, 95 Wash. 2d 94, 621 P.2d 1279 (1980).
The doctrine of estoppel is a different principle than,
and must be distinguished from, the legal doctrine of
waiver. As noted above, waiver is the voluntary,
intentional relinquishment of a known right.
Hunter, 669 P.2d at 432.
The attorneys in the Soters' litigation patterned Jury
Instruction No. 18 and Special Interrogatories Nos. 22-24 after
the above-quoted language.
Blomquist.

Hunter did not overrule Phoenix or

It cited those cases with approval and quoted the

black letter definition for waiver as set forth in them.
-22-
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it is necessary that tue person against whom a
waiver is claimed have intended to relinquish the
right, advantage, or benefit and his action must be
inconsistent with any other intent than an intent to
waive it.
Further, to constitute a waiver, other than
by express agreement, there must be unequivocal acts or
conduct evincing an intent to waive.
(citation omit
ted).
Intent cannot be inferred from doubtful or
ambiguous factors.
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right.

The court apparently felt such an explanation was unnec-

essary in Phoenix and Blomquist where, through no tortuous process could the conduct be construed as a manifestation of waiver.
Blomquist, 445 P.2d at 3.
B.

Supreme Court Developments Since Hunter Remain
Consistent

Shortly after Hunter, this Court decided two other waiver
cases.

Anqelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 772,

776-77 (Utah 1983) (handed down one month after Hunter), cited
Hunter for the same language ("to constitute waiver, one's
actions or conduct must be distinctly made, must evince in some
unequivocal manner an intent to waive, and must be inconsistent
with any other intent").

Parks v. Zions First National Bank, 673

P.2d 590 (Utah 1983) used only the definition of waiver from
Blomquist.

The court found that the plaintiff had not at any

time intentionally and distinctly relinquished his claim of ownership against the property.

Id. at 605.

In Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium Company, 704 P.2d 573
(Utah 1985), the plaintiff sued the defendant for intentionally
interfering with plaintiffs1 right-of-way to water in an irrigation ditch.

As a fall back position the defendant asserted

waiver claiming that the plaintiff, after complaining for more
than a year, and thereafter allowing the defendant to put in a

-24-
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whether the State waived its right to the alternative royalty
provision, the Court said:
[W]e state the law here for guidance to the trial court
in deciding this issue on remand. "A waiver is the
intentional relinquishment of a known right.ff American
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Blomquist, 21 Utah 289, 292, 445
P.2d 1, 3 (1968) (quoting Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Heath, 90
Utah 187, 194, 61 P.2d 308, 311 (1936)). Mere silence
is not a waiver unless there is some duty or obligation
to speak. Dalton v. Le Blanc, 350 F.2d 95, 98-99 (10th
Cir. 1965).
Id. at 730.

Perhaps it would have assisted the trial court to

have mentioned that the State's silence must also be inconsistent
with any other intent, but there is no indication from the decision that this Court intended to exclude that element from the
trial court's eventual finding.
Recently this Court decided Rees v. Intermountain Health
Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1991).

The plaintiff, Dr. Rees,

was called before a review committee at Intermountain Health
Care's McKay Dee Hospital in Ogden, where he was confronted with
the high mortality rate occurring in his cardiac patients.

Dr.

Rees was presented with the alternative of voluntarily placing a
moratorium on his elective surgeries, and working as an assistant
to another surgeon, or undergoing due process which he was told
would result in a formal revocation of his hospital privileges.
Dr. Rees remained silent at the meeting and was apparently surprised several days later when he received a letter from one of
-26-
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*. w a i v e r is the intent ional re] ii lquishment of a
right.
v^aive a right there must be an existing right,
benefit, or advantage; knowledge of its existence; and
an intention to relinquish it
' rhe action or conduct of a pa, , *u. , *, ^ . A it
must unequivocally show an intent f
waive _ m u s t at
least b e ' .insistent v ; * ^ ~~- - f
•,*.;• >m

A w a i v e r of rights m a y b e s h o w n from j ., Luc c i r c u m s t a n c e s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e a l l e g e d w a i v e
To p r o v e a wai /ei: , it m u s t b e s h o w n tnat tne pa.
had k n o w l e d g e of h i s rights a n d d i d s o m e t h i n g d e s i g n ed 1.y o r knowing 1 y to re 1 inquish them,
A w a i v e r in ay be p r o v e d b y i n d i r e c t e v i d e n c e . .
Silence, or failure to act under some circumstances may
be sufficient to prove waiver where such silence or
failure to act is ui iequivoca1 and i i Iconsistent with ai iy
o t h e r ii itei it ,
A w a i , e r m a y b e i r i f e r r e d f r o m a p a r t y' s a c k n o w 1 edgment of his rights and his subsequent course of conduct. You may look at the totality of the circumstances , including the backgroi ind experience and con duct of the party to determine if he made a voli intary
waiver of a right.

These statements proceeded from Dr. Rees1 requested instructions based on the Utah Court of Appeals holding in Clark v.
American Concept Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah App. 1988),
and B. R. Woodward Marketing Inc. v. Collins Food Service, Inc.,
754 P.2d 99, 101 (Utah App. 1988).

Intermountain Health Care

Appellant's Brief at 15, Docket No. 890170; Rees at 1074.

Both

of these Court of Appeals decisions like the Rees case itself,
dealt with implied waiver, not express waiver.
ter answered two special interrogatories.

The jury thereaf-

The first simply asked

whether Dr. Rees had waived his rights to due process and to voluntarily give up his surgery privileges.
jury to state Dr. Rees1 damages.

The second, asked the

Intermountain Health Care

Appellant's Brief at 4.
Intermountain Health Care took the position on appeal that
where Dr. Rees1 conduct was silence, and the relinquishment was
to be implied therefrom, that requiring a finding that his conduct was "unequivocal and inconsistent with any other intent"
unnecessarily embellished the standard of proof expressed in
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Heath, 61 P.2d 308 (Utah 1936), and American
Savings & Loan Association v. Blomquist, 445 P.2d 1 (Utah 1968).
Intermountain Health Care Appellant's Brief at 15-16.
In Rees this court held that the standard of proof in
Blomquist and Phoenix Ins. Co., requiring that waiver "be
-28-
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In spite of the detour caused by the parties reliance on the
Court of Appeals' decisions, the Rees decision properly put the
law in this area back on its proper course and held, once again
consistent with Hunter, that in circumstances involving implied
waiver, whether the conduct is action or silence, it must be distinct, unequivocal and inconsistent with any other intent.
1.

The Standard for Evidence of Implied Waiver in the
Decisions of the Court of Appeals Fails to Recognize that Waiver Rests Solely on the Intention of
the Party Holding the Right,

In Rees , jury instruction No. 9 patterned after the language
in B.R. Woodward Marketing v. Collins Food, Inc., 754 P.2d at
101, stated "The action . . . [constituting the relinquishment]
must unequivocally show an intent to waive or must at least be
inconsistent with any other intent."
This instruction was not a correct statement of the law.

It

mixed the concept of implied waiver and actual intent with the
concept of constructive intent based on conduct which is of such
a nature as to mislead the other person into believing that the
waiver was intended or assented to.

This mistake was predicated

on a single sentence from 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver § 158
at 843 stating:
As in other situations, the question whether
waiver will be found in any particular case
depends not upon the secret intention of the
party against whom is is asserted, but upon the
-30-
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never been overruled.

Moreover, the instruction and

interrogatories represented an accurate statement of the law
insofar as it related to implied waiver based upon actual intent
to relinquish a known right.

In view of each of the cases deal-

ing with waiver decided by this Court subsequent to Hunter, they
remain a correct statement of the law.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In summary, there is not a single standard generally applicable to all situations involving waiver.

However, the distinc-

tion does not run along the lines of action and conduct versus
silence or inaction.

Rather, the standard is determined by the

nature of the relinquishment, that is, whether it is express or
implied, or based on conduct amounting to an estoppel.
Where the relinquishment of a known right is expressly made,
the relinquishment must be distinct.
Where the relinquishment of a known right is implied from
some positive act, or by positive inaction, the relinquishment
must be distinct, it must be manifested in some unequivocal manner, and it must be inconsistent with any other intent.
The relinquishment of a known right may also be implied by
conduct so inconsistent with the intent to enforce the right as
to induce a reasonable belief that it has been relinquished.
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APPENDIX

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SOTER'S INC., et al.,

|
I

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1
1

Civil No. 8560
(Judge Ernest Baldwin)

Plaintiffs,

vs.
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Defendants,
SHERWIN KNUDSEN d/b/a
TRI-K GENERAL CONTRACTORS,

]
]

Case No. 8561
(Consolidated)

Plaintiff,

vs.

;

SOTER'S, INC., et al.
Defendants.

i
]

This case came on for hearing before the above-entitled Court
sitting with a jury on May 11, 1988.

Evidence in the case was

closed on May 20, 1988 and the Court heard argument on Motions for
Directed Verdict on May 23 and 24, 1988.

In response to said

Motions, the Court dismissed all affirmative claims for damages of
Soter's, Inc. and Sherwin Knudsen d/b/a Tri-K Contractors ("TriK") against Continental Federal Savings Bank ("Continental"). Upon
stipulation, the Court also dismissed the fraud claim of Continental against Soter's, Inc. and the conspiracy to defraud claim of
Continental against Soter's, Inc. and Tri-K.

Also on stipulation,

the Court dismissed the direct claims of Continental against United
Pacific Insurance Company

("United Pacific") on its Performance

APPENDIX A

Bond issued to Tri-K and Deseret Federal Savings and Loan Association ("Deseret Federal") as joint-obligees and against Tri-K for
breach of its Construction Contract with Soter's, Inc.
The Court further ruled that no party had presented evidence
justifying an award of punitive damages and that that issue would
not, therefore, be submitted to the jury.

The Court also took from

the jury the issue of whether Deseret Federal had properly charged
two draw requests against a Revolving Line of Credit given by
Deseret Federal to Summit Park Co. ("Summit Park") finding that the
payment of the draw requests out of the Revolving Line of Credit
had not been authorized.

The Court further found, however, that

said payments were properly chargeable to the Promissory Note and
Construction Loan Agreement between Deseret Federal and Soter's,
Inc.

Finally, the Court ruled that the mechanicfs lien claim of

Tri-K against the condominium property presented equitable issues
and that the Court would hear argument on that claim after the
remaining issues in the case had been submitted to the jury.

Upon

further hearing, the Court ruled that Tri-K was not entitled to a
mechanic's lien.
The remaining factual issues were submitted to the jury under
52 special interrogatories on May 25, 1988. The jury returned its
answers to those interrogatories on May 26, 1988. The Court heard
further oral argument of counsel on June 27, 1988, July 15, 1988,
and September 21, 1988, on various motions of the parties for entry
of judgment based upon answers of the jury to certain special
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interrogatories or for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict on

certain other answers of the jury.

All parties agree that after

the jury rendered its verdict, the parties made various motions,
including motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

The

Court having now considered the jury's answers to the special
interrogatories, the evidence introduced at the time of trial and
the arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises,
enters its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment as
follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I.
Pursuant to the Pre-Trial Order stipulated to by all parties
and submitted to this Court, certain uncontested facts underlying
the matters at issue in this case were stipulated and agreed to by
all the parties.

The Court does hereby adopt those stipulated and

agreed facts as a portion of its Findings of Fact as follows:
1.

Soter's, Inc. is a Utah corporation and is the fee owner

of the land on which the condominium project which is the subject
of this lawsuit was partially constructed.
2.

Summit Park is a Utah corporation and is the fee owner

of the 350 acre undeveloped parcel.
3.

Gregory S. Soter and Julie Soter are all individuals and

residents of the State of Utah.
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4.

Deseret Federal is a federally chartered savings and loan

association with its principal place of business located in Salt
Lake City, Utah.
5.

Continental formerly did business as Continental Federal

Savings and Loan Association and is a federally chartered savings
bank with its principal place of business located in the State of
Virginia.
6.

Sherwin Knudsen is an individual and resident of Salt

Lake County, State of Utah, and does business as Tri-K.

Tri-K was

the general contractor for the construction of the condominium
project which is at issue in this case.
7.

United Pacific is a corporation organized under the laws

of the State of Washington and is authorized to do business in the
State of Utah.
8.

On April

4, 1984, Soter's, Inc. and

Deseret Federal

executed a Construction Loan Agreement.
9.

In connection

with

the

Construction

Loan

Agreement,

Soter's, Inc. executed a Promissory Note dated April 4, 1984, in
the face amount of $3,000,000.00.
10.

As security

for the Construction

Loan Agreement

and

Promissory Note, Soter's, Inc. executed a Construction Deed of
Trust, Security Agreement, and Assignment of Rents dated April 4,
1984, with respect to the condominium project property.
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11.

In addition to the Deed of Trust, Soter's, Inc. also

executed certain UCC-1 financing statements dated April 23, and
April 25, 1984.
12.

Gregory

S.

Soter,

and

Julie

Soter

each

executed

a

guarantee dated April 4, 1984, guaranteeing the performance of the
Promissory Note by Soter1s, Inc.
13.

Summit Park executed that certain Deed of Trust, Security

Agreement,

and

additional

security

Promissory Note.
14.

Summit

Assignment
for

of
the

Rents

dated

Construction

April
Loan

4,

1984, as

Agreement

and

This Deed of Trust covered the 350 acre parcel.
Park

also

executed

certain

UCC-1

financing

statements dated April 23, 1984 and April 25, 1984 which pertained
to the 3 50 acre parcel.
15.
of

Credit

Deseret Federal and Summit Park executed a Revolving Line
Agreement

dated

April

4,

1984,

in

the

amount

of

$350,000.00.
16.

In connection with the Revolving Line of Credit Agree-

ment, Summit Park executed a Secured Revolving Promissory Note
dated April 4, 1984, in the principal amount of $350,000.00.
17.

As security for the obligations under the Revolving Line

of Credit Agreement, Summit Park executed a Deed of Trust, Security
Agreement, and Assignment of Rents dated April 4, 1984, covering
the 350 acres.
18.

As

further

security

for

the

obligations

under

the

Revolving Line of Credit Agreement, Soter1s, Inc. executed a Deed
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of Trust, Security Agreement, and Assignment of Rents dated April
4, 1984, covering the condominium property.
19.

With regard to the Revolving Line of Credit Agreement,

Summit Park and Soter's, Inc. also executed certain UCC-1 Financing
Statements pertaining to the condominium property and the 350 acre
parcel.
20.

Gregory S. Soter and Julie Soter also each executed a

guarantee dated April 4, 1984, for the purpose of guaranteeing the
performance by Summit Park of the Revolving

Line of Credit

Agreement.
21.

The Construction Loan Agreement and Promissory Note

between Soter1s, Inc. and Deseret Federal were preceded by an
earlier construction loan agreement and promissory note between
Soter's, Inc. and Zion's First National Bank ("Zions").
22.

The disbursements under the Construction Loan Agreement

and Promissory Note between Soter's, Inc. and Deseret Federal were
made as follows:

04/04/84
04/04/84
04/12/84
04/20/84
04/24/84
04/27/84
04/30/84
06/04/84
06/12/84
06/26/84
07/06/84
08/17/84
09/21/84
10/30/84
12/03/84
<S\dfj-sfc9.kh

Payee

Amount

Date
>

55,000.00
43.00
1,257,415.00
3,205.00
1,373.76
71,598.00
8,842.00
144,677.21
5,723.50
4,882.50
119,473.75
161,895.59
216,181.07
186,949.91
68,087.66

Deseret Federal
Deseret Federal
Zions
Zions
Zions
Tri-K
Chapman & Cutler
Tri-K
Associated Title
Associated Title
Tri-K
Tri-K
Tri-K
Tri-K
Tri-K
6

Purpose
Loan Set Up
Credit Reports
Loan Payoff
Loan Payoff
Loan Payoff
Draw Request
Attorneys* Fees
Draw Request
Title Insurance
Title Insurance
Draw Request
Draw Request
Draw Request
Draw Request
Draw Request

In addition to the above-listed disbursements, Deseret Federal
made other disbursements and interest charges related to the loans
and the Camelot Condominium Project.
23.

The disbursements under the Revolving

Agreement

and

Promissory

Note between Summit

Line of Credit

Park Company and

Deseret Federal were made as follows:
Date

Amount

05/01/84
06/26/84
12/18/84

$

02/07/84
In

Payee

Purpose

2,500.00
901.00
67,769.28

Chapman & Cutler
Associated Title
Tri-K

Attorneys1 Fees
Title Insurance
Draw Request

72,256.50

Tri-K

Draw Request

addition

to

the

above

listed

disbursements,

interest

charges were made to the Revolving Line of Credit.
24.

By letter, dated March 5, 1984, Continental committed to

participate with Deseret Federal in funding the construction loan
for the Camelot Condominiums, subject to the terms and conditions
outlined in said commitment letter.
letter

may

be

so

construed,

no

Except as this commitment

formal

written

participation

agreement was ever executed between Deseret Federal and Continental.

As evidence of the participation of Continental, Deseret

Federal

on August

Continental.

22,

1984, endorsed

the

Promissory

Note to

Thereafter, Continental reimbursed Deseret Federal

for a portion of the loan funds which had been disbursed in the
amount of $1,705,767.17.
25.

Under date of April 4, 1984, United Pacific issued its

Performance Bond insuring the performance of the general contrac-
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tor, Tri-K.

Soter's, Inc. and Deseret Federal were named as joint

obligees.
26.

On April 4, 1984, Deseret Federal, by a letter addressed

to the Dale Barton Agency, who was an agent for the United Pacific,
stated, in part, "This letter will confirm that Deseret Federal
Savings and Loan Association of Salt Lake City, Utah, will escrow
funds into a construction account in the amount of $2,801,850.00
for the construction of the Camelot Condominium located at Summit
Park, Utah pursuant to the construction loan agreement."
27.

Under date of April 4, 1984, United Pacific also issued

its Payment

and Materials Bond with Soter's, Inc. and

Deseret

Federal again being named as joint obligees.
28.

Tri-K submitted monthly draw requests for payment of

labor and materials purchased for the construction of the Camelot
Condominiums.

Tri-K

submitted

its draw

requests

directly

to

Deseret Federal and was paid the amount requested on each draw
request submitted directly to Deseret Federal, except for the draw
requests submitted for materials and labor provided for the project
in the months of January, February, March, and April 1985.
29.

On or about April 2, 1985, Deseret Federal prepared an

"Extension Agreement" which was accepted by Soter f s, Inc. and was
approved by the Loan Committee of Deseret Federal and pursuant to
which the due date of the first payment under the note and deed of
trust payable by Soter f s, Inc. was extended from April 5, 1985,
until October 5, 1985.
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30.

Except as the questions of validity and enforceability

may be reserved

in the contested

issues of

fact, there

is no

dispute that the above referenced Notes, Deeds of Trust, Agreements
and Bonds were executed by those having authority for and in behalf
of the parties thereto.
II.
At the conclusion of trial and before submission to the jury
of the contested issues of fact on special interrogatory, the Court
ruled on the parties1 motions for directed verdict.

Based upon

such rulings the Court enters the following additional Findings of
Fact:
31.

Continental was not a party to the Construction Loan

Agreement or the Promissory Note and at no time did Continental
agree to directly fund the Construction Loan or Promissory Note or
make payments directly to Soter's, Inc. or Tri-K.
32.

The Construction Loan Agreement expressly provided that

Deseret Federal was obligated to fund the subject loan regardless
of whether it obtained

funds from a participant provided that

Soter's,

in default

Inc. was

conditions

not

precedent

for

each

and

advance.

had

complied

Section

8(f)

Construction Loan Agreement provides:
Lender*s obligation to make each advance
of the Loan, including the first advance, shall
also be subject to the satisfaction of the
following conditions:

(f) Lender shall have received from the
Participant an amount equal to 95% of the
d\dfs-sfc9.kh
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with

all

of the

requested advance; provided however, if Borrower is not in default, has timely complied
with all of the conditions precedent to an
advance, and Lender has not received the
aforesaid amount from Participant within 10
days after the date of requested disbursement
then Lender shall waive the requirement that
it receive such amount prior to the disbursement of such advance.
33.

Continental

at no time made any payments directly to

Soter's, Inc. or Tri-K.
34.

The $1,705,767.17 funded by Continental was paid directly

to Deseret Federal to reimburse Deseret Federal for disbursements
it had already made under the loan.
35.

Deseret Federal was the only intended beneficiary of the

agreement of Continental to participate in the Construction Loan.
36.

In endorsing the Promissory Note to Continental on August

22, 1984, Deseret Federal intended only to assign to Continental
Deseret Federal's rights under the Promissory Note to collect the
amounts due and owing

as security

for repayment of the

funds

advanced by Continental and also to secure any funds advanced by
Deseret Federal.

Deseret Federal did not intend and, in fact, did

not assign to Continental its obligations under the Promissory Note
or Construction Loan Agreement.
37.

As a consequence of such endorsement, Continental became

a holder of the Promissory Note.
38.

Continental took endorsement of the Promissory Note from

Deseret Federal for value and in good faith.
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39.

At the time the Promissory Note was endorsed by Deseret

Federal to Continental it was not overdue and had not been dishonored,
40.

Deseret Federal was never expressly authorized to act as

the agent of Continental and Deseret Federal never represented
itself to be the agent of Continental nor did it undertake to act
or speak for Continental as its agent.
41.

Deseret Federal was not authorized in writing by Summit

Park to make the December 18, 1984 disbursement in the amount of
$67,769.28 paid to Tri-K for Draw Request No. 7, dated December 4,
1984,

or the

February

7,

1985 disbursement

in the

amount

of

$72,256.50 paid to Tri-K for Draw Request No. 8, dated January 11,
1988, out of the Revolving Line of Credit.

Those funds were used,

however, to pay Draw Requests of Tri-K for work completed prior to
December 31, 1984.
42.

Tri-K

provided

labor

and

materials

to

the

Camelot

Condominium Project from August 1983 through April 1985.
III.
The disputed issues of fact remaining were then submitted to
the jury on special interrogatory.

In accordance with the jury

answers to those special interrogatories, the Court does hereby
enter the additional following Findings of Fact:
43.

The jury found in answer to Special Interrogatory 1 that

as of January 19, 1985 and beyond the $3,000,000.00 Construction
Loan was in balance because the undisbursed portion of the Con-
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struction Loan equaled or exceeded the estimated costs of completinq the Camelot Condominium Project.
44.

In answer to Special Interroqatory 5, the jury found that

as of January 1985, the Camelot Condominium Project could not have
been completed on or before April 4, 1985 as required by the
Construction Loan Aqreement.
45.

In answer to Special Interroqatories 6, 7, and 8, the

jury found that all of the elements of waiver by Deseret Federal
of the April 4, 1985 completion date had been established and that
Deseret Federal had waived such completion date.
46.

In answer to Special Interroqatory 9, the jury found that

the amount of $1,250,000.00 would fairly compensate Soter's, Inc.
for the loss proximately caused by Deseret Federal's decision to
stop further fundinq of the loan. The Court modifies such findinq
made by the jury, however, insofar as the jury attempted to award
interest calculated on a basis which was not leqally justifiable.
The answer to Special Interroqatory 9 is, accordinqly, amended by
the Court to provide for interest on the $1,250,000.00 at the leqal
rate from and after the date of judqment entered herein.
47.

In answer to Special Interrogatory 10, the jury found

that Sote^s, Inc. had breached the terms of the Promissory Note
and Construction Loan Aqreement in that the Camelot Condominium
Project was not completed on or before April 4, 1985; Soter's, Inc.
abandoned work on the Camelot Condominium Project and construction
ceased for 21 consecutive days; Soter's, Inc. permitted mechanic's
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liens to be filed against the Camelot Condominium Project; &nd
Soter's, Inc. failed to pay principal and interest on or before
October 5# 1985, the date to which repayment had been extended.
48.

In answer to Special Interrogatory 11, the jury found

that Soter's, Inc. was indebted to Deseret Federal and Continental
under the Construction Loan and Promissory Note in the amount of
the principal advanced and the interest accrued.

The evidence

reflected that the principal balance due under the Promissory Note
is $2,700,485.75 and the Court does also further find that the
interest accrued on that principal through October 31, 1988 is
$1,268,941.28.
49.

In answer to Special Interrogatory 12, the jury found

that as of August 22, 1984, when the Promissory Note was endorsed
to Continental by Deseret Federal, Continental did not have notice
that Soter's, Inc. could claim that Deseret Federal had waived the
requirement that the undisbursed portion of the Construction Loan
equaled or exceeded the estimated costs of completing the Camelot
Condominiums.
50.

In answer to Special Interrogatories 13, 14, and 15, the

jury found that all of the elements of waiver had not been
established to demonstrate that Continental had acted in such a
manner as to waive its right as the holder of the Promissory Note
to require Soter's, Inc. to complete the Camelot Condominium
Project by April 4, 1985, pursuant to the Construction Loan
Agreement.
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51.
jury

In answer to Special Interrogatories 16, 17# and 18, the

found that the Construction

Contract entered into by and

between Tri-K and Soterfs, Inc. was that certain contract providing
for a lump sum amount of $2#801,850.00 with a completion date of
December 31, 1984.
52.

In answer to Special Interrogatory 19, the jury found

that Tri-K did not substantially complete the construction of the
Camelot Condominium Project on or before December 31, 1984.
53.

In answer to Special Interrogatories 20 and 21, the jury

found that Tri-K withdrew all or a portion of its profits from Draw
Requests

paid

improperly

by

Deseret

withdrawn

$202,651.74.
unauthorized

by

Federal

Tri-K

and

that

the dollar

profit

through

said

Draw Requests was

The Court finds that such withdrawal of profit was
because Tri-K had

not completed

the Camelot

Con-

dominium Project, as was required before Tri-K was entitled to any
profit.
54.
jury

In answering Special Interrogatories 22, 23, and 24, the

found that with regard

to the claims of Deseret Federal

against Tri-K all of the elements necessary to demonstrate that
Deseret Federal had acted in such a manner to waive its right under
the Construction Contract to have the Camelot Condominium Project
completed on or before December 31, 1984, had not been established
and that Deseret Federal did not, therefore, waive such right.
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55.

In answering Special Interrogatory 26, the jury found

that United Pacific did not complete the Construction Contract or
remedy the default of Tri-K under the Construction Contract.
56.
that

the

In response to Special Interrogatory 27, the jury found
cost

of

completing

the

construction

of the

Camelot

Condominium Project was $2,602,500.00.
57.

The Court further finds that with respect to the cost of

completion United Pacific is entitled

to set off against that

amount those funds which were remaining unpaid to Tri-K. The Court
finds that the amount of such set off is $386,581.00 calculated as
follows:
a.

Pursuant to paragraphs 6.1 of the Construction Loan
Agreement, Deseret Federal was obligated to fund
$2,554,850.00 for "construction costs including payoff of existing indebtedness".

b.

Tri-K had received in payment for construction costs
the amount of $1,715,269.00 which had been paid
either directly by Deseret Federal or which Tri-K
had received through the earlier construction loan
from Zion's.

These payments to Tri-K out of the

Zion's loan were part of the prior existing indebtedness which was paid off by Deseret Federal.
c.

In addition to the payments which Tri-K had received
out of the Zion's loan for "construction costs"
Deseret Federal was required to expend an additional
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$453,000.00 to pay off the existing indebtedness to
Zion's.
d.

When the $1,715,269.00 in construction costs paid
to Tri-K and the additional $453,000.00 in existing
indebtedness are deducted from the $2,554,850.00
which Deseret Federal was committed to expend on
construction

costs under

the Construction

Loan

Agreement the balance payable to Tri-K for construction costs is $386,581.00.
58.

In answer to Special Interrogatories 30 through 38, the

jury found that Deseret Federal induced Tri-K to remain on the job
after December 31, 1984 by promising to pay Tri-K for construction
costs incurred for the Camelot Condominium Project during January,
February, March, and April 1985. Although the jury's findings are
framed in terms of a fraudulent inducement, the Court finds that
there is not competent evidence in the record to support a finding
of actual fraud.

Nevertheless, the Court does concur with the

jury's finding that Deseret Federal did make such a promise to pay
and failed to pay Tri-K.

The Court further finds that as a

consequence of such promise to pay Tri-K, Deseret Federal is
estopped from denying its obligation to pay for construction costs
incurred

for the Camelot

Condominium

Project during January,

February, March and April of 1985.
59.

The jury found in response to Special Interrogatory 39

that the financial loss suffered by Tri-K as a result of such
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promise to pay Tri-K was $419,482.58 plus interest.
is not supported by competent evidence in the record.

That figure
The Court

finds that the amount to which Tri-K is entitled is $102,796.00
which is the net amount of the unpaid draw requests for January,
February, March and April of 1985 after deducting amounts due to
subcontractors and suppliers which amounts have been previously
settled and paid.
60.

In answer to Special Interrogatory 40, the jury found

that Deseret Federal made no misrepresentation of a presently
existing material fact regarding the escrow of funds into a
construction account in the amount of $2,801,850.00 for the
construction of the Camelot Condominium Project.
61.

Special Interrogatories 48 through 50 dealt with whether

Deseret Federal had waived the December 31, 1984 completion date
under the Construction Contract with regard to its claim against
United Pacific. While the answers to these interrogatories appear
on the surface to be inconsistent with the jury's answers to
Special Interrogatories 22 through 24, where the jury found that
Deseret Federal had not waived the December 31, 1984 completion
date with regard to its claim against Tri-K, Special Interrogatory
50 misstates the third element of waiver which was correctly stated
in Special Interrogatory 24. Interrogatory 50 essentially restates
the first element of waiver in which the jury found under both
Special Interrogatory 22 and Special Interrogatory 48 had been
established.
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the Court finds that the evidence of waiver is the same for both
Tri-K and United Pacific and further finds that if the jury had
been given the same three elements of waiver with regard to United
Pacific as it had been given with respect to Tri-K that the jury's
answers would have been the same.

Accordingly, the Court finds

that Deseret Federal did not waive its right to claim against
United Pacific that Tri-K breached its obligation to complete the
project by December 31, 1984,
62.

In answer to Special Interrogatory 51, the jury found

that the amount of retainage from the Draw Requests which Tri-K was
entitled to be paid by Soter's, Inc. was $419,432.58 plus interest.
This amount of retainage awarded by the jury to Tri-K has no basis
in the evidence in this case and the Court declines to follow the
juryfs answer to this interrogatory.

The evidence which was

introduced during the course of the trial was that the amount of
retainage from the Draw Requests that had been withheld on the TriK Construction Contract was $4 3,889.72, and the Court so finds.
However, inasmuch as Tri-K failed to complete the Camelot Condominium Project, and has already unauthorizedly withdrawn profit
in the amount of $202,651.74, the Court finds that there is
insufficient evidence which would entitle Tri-K to any retainage
and accordingly sets aside the jury's finding on this issue.
63.

In answering Special Interrogatory 52, the jury found

that Tri-K had established that it was entitled to receive from
Soter's, Inc. the profit which it would have received upon comple-
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tion of the Camelot Condominium Project.
to

complete

the Camelot

Condominium

Inasmuch as Tri-K failed

Project,

and has

already

unauthorizedly withdrawn profit in the amount of $202,651.74, the
Court finds that there is insufficient evidence which would entitle
Tri-K to any profit and accordingly sets aside the jury's finding
on this issue.
64.

Based

upon

the

jury's

answers

to

the

Special

Interrogatories and the evidence at trial, the Court finds that
Tri-K knowingly and improperly withdrew through its Draw Requests
profits in the amount of $202,651.74, and that Tri-K has already
received

payment

constructed

by

for the reasonable value of all improvements

Tri-K with

respect

to

the

Camelot

Condominium

Project.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court does now
enter its Conclusions of Law as follows:
1.

Deseret Federal did not act as the agent of Continental

in negotiating the Construction Loan Agreement or in funding the
Construction

Loan, and the claims

of Soter's, Inc. and Tri-K

against Continental predicated upon such alleged agency relationship should be dismissed with prejudice.
2.

Deseret Federal, in inducing Tri-K to remain on the

Camelot Condominium Project after December 31, 1984, was not acting
in any manner as the agent of Continental, and the claims of Tri-
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K against Continental predicated upon such alleged agency should
be dismissed with prejudice.
3.

The arrangement between Deseret Federal and Continental

for Continental to participate in the Construction Loan was not
intended as a third-party beneficiary contract for the benefit of
either Soter's, Inc. or Tri-K, and the claims of Soter's, Inc. and
Tri-K against Continental predicated upon a third-party beneficiary
claim should be dismissed with prejudice.
4.
respect

Continental and Deseret Federal were not partners with
to

the Construction

Loan

between

Deseret Federal

and

Soter's, Inc.
5.

Deseret Federal and Continental were not joint-venturers

with respect to the Construction Loan between Deseret Federal and
Soter's, Inc.
6.

There is no basis in the record upon which any party can

justify the award of punitive or exemplary damages and no punitive
or exemplary damages should, therefore, be awarded to any party.
7.

Continental having stipulated at the close of trial that

there was insufficient evidence of record to support its claim of
fraud against Soter's, Inc. and its claim of conspiracy to defraud
against Soter's, Inc. and Tri-K those claims should be dismissed
with prejudice.
8.

The April 2, 1985 "Extension Agreement" extended only the

date on which the first payment under the Promissory Note was due
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and did not extend any duties or obligations of Deseret Federal to
further fund said Note.
9.

In response to a Motion to Dismiss of United Pacific,

Continental stipulated at the close of trial that it was not a
joint obligee under the Performance Bond of United Pacific and that
its interests were sufficiently protected by the claims of Deseret
Federal against United Pacific on the Bond.

Based upon such

stipulation of Continental, Continental's direct claims against
United Pacific should be dismissed with prejudice.
10.

In response to a Motion to Dismiss of Tri-K, Continental

stipulated at the close of trial that it was not a party to the
Construction Contract between Soter's, Inc. and Tri-K or the direct
assignee of the benefits of Soter's, Inc. under that contract and
that its interests were protected by the claims of Deseret Federal
against Tri-K as the assignee of the rights of Soter's, Inc. under
such contract.

Based upon such stipulation, the claims of Con-

tinental against Tri-K for breach of the Construction Contract
should be dismissed with prejudice.
11.

Deseret Federal having stipulated before trial that it

did not wish to pursue its indemnity claim against Soter's, Inc.
under the Assignment of Construction Contract and Consent, the
indemnity claim against Soter's, Inc. should be dismissed with
prejudice.
12.

Inasmuch as Deseret Federal ceased funding the Construc-

tion Loan after December 31, 1984, Soter's# Inc. is entitled to
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have judgment in its favor and against Deseret Federal for the sum
of $1,250,000.00, together with interest thereon at the legal rate
from the date of the Order, Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure
entered in this matter.

Deseret Federal is entitled to offset

Soter's, Inc.'s judgment against it by Deseret Federal's judgment
for

its portion

of the principal

Soter's, Inc. Promissory Note.

and

interest

due under the

Deseret Federal's portion of the

principal and interest due under the Soter's, Inc. Promissory Note
through October 31, 1988 is $1,550,529.62.
13.

Deseret Federal waived the April 4, 1985 completion date

contained in the Construction Loan Agreement between Soter's, Inc.
and Deseret Federal.
14.
implied

Inasmuch as Soter's, Inc. failed to submit the breach of
covenant of good

faith and

fair dealing to the jury,

Deseret Federal did not breach the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing and such claim should be dismissed with prejudice.
15.

The December 18, 1984 and the February 7, 1985 disburse-

ments out of the Revolving Line of Credit are properly attributable
to the Promissory Note and Construction Loan Agreement, and the
amounts of such disbursements, plus interest and all other charges
and

costs relating thereto, should be added

to the amount of

principal disbursed under the Promissory Note and Construction Loan
Agreement. Therefore, Deseret Federal did not breach the Revolving
Line of Credit Agreement and did not convert money from Summit
Park, and such claims should be dismissed with prejudice.
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16.

Soter's, Inc. breached the Promissory Note and Construc-

tion Loan Agreement by not completing

the Camelot Condominium

Project on or before April 4, 1985, by abandoning work on the
Camelot

Condominium

consecutive

days, by

Project

and

permitting

ceasing

construction

mechanic's

for

21

liens to be filed

against the Camelot Condominium Project, and by failing to pay
principal and interest on or before October 5, 1985.
17.

Inasmuch as Deseret Federal endorsed the Soter's, Inc.

Promissory Note as secured by the Soter's Trust Deed and the Summit
Park Trust Deed to Continental on August 22, 1984, both Continental
and Deseret Federal have an interest in the Soter's, Inc. Promissory Note.

As a consequence of the interests that Continental and

Deseret Federal each hold in the Soter's, Inc. Promissory Note as
secured by the Soter's Trust Deed and the Summit Park Trust Deed,
Continental and Deseret Federal may jointly foreclose the Soter's
Trust Deed and the Summit Park Trust Deed.
18.

Continental holds the Soter's, Inc. Promissory Note under

the endorsement by Deseret Federal as a holder in due course.
19.

The total sum of $3,969,427.03, together with interest

continuing on the principal amount of $2,700,485.75 at the rate
set forth in the Promissory Note from and after October 31, 1988,
plus the attorney's fees and costs of Court incurred by Continental
in conjunction with this case, is due under the Soter's, Inc.
Promissory Note as secured by the Trust Deeds that are the subject
to this action, which Trust Deeds were given by Soter's, Inc. and
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Summit

Park,

beneficiary.

as trustors, to Deseret

Federal,

as trustee and

The Trust Deed given by Soter's, Inc. (hereinafter

referred to as the "Soter's Trust Deed") was recorded in the office
of the Summit County Recorder on April 23, 1984 as Entry 219486,
in Book 297 at Page 381.
(hereinafter referred

The Trust Deed given by Summit Park

to as the "Summit

Park Trust

Deed") was

recorded in the office of the Summit County Recorder on April 23,
1984 as Entry No. 219487, in Book 297 at Page 401 and rerecorded
in the office of the Summit County Recorder on May 3, 1984 as Entry
No. 219995, in Book 298 at Page 626.

The entire amount of the

Soter's, Inc. Promissory Note is presently due.
20.

Soter's, Inc. is entitled to offset its judgment in the

amount of $1,2 50,000.00 against the amount due on the Soter's, Inc.
Promissory Note. Such offset, however, is limited to the principal
advanced by Deseret Federal, together with accrued interest on that
principal.
21.

The Soter's Trust Deed and the Summit Park Trust Deed,

which cover the real property described in Exhibits "A" and "B"
attached hereto, are valid and subsisting liens upon said real
property

securing

the

indebtedness

identified

above,

and

the

interests of all parties in said real property are inferior and
subordinate to the liens of the Soter's Trust Deed and the Summit
Park Trust Deed.
22.

Continental and Deseret Federal have duly elected to seek

foreclosure of the Soter's Trust Deed and the Summit Park Trust
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Deed in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages
upon real property, and are entitled to a judgment and decree of
foreclosure•
23.

The interests, if any, in the parcels of real property

described in Exhibits "Alf and "B w hereto of all parties herein,
except Continental and Deseret Federal, all those claiming by,
through or under any parties herein except Continental and Deseret
Federal, and all persons whose interest in said property was not
duly recorded in the proper office at the time of recording of the
Soterfs Trust Deed and the Summit Park Trust Deed be and the same
are hereby barred and foreclosed, subject to their statutory rights
of redemption, if any.
24.

In the event that the proceeds of the sale of the parcels

of real property described in Exhibits "A1 and MB,f hereto, which
are covered by the Soter's Trust Deed and the Summit Park Trust
Deed, are insufficient to satisfy the indebtedness set forth in
paragraph

19 hereof,

Continental

and

Deseret

Federal

will be

entitled to have and recover judgment against Soter's and Summit
Park, jointly and severally, in such amount.
25.

Inasmuch as Gregory S. Soter and Julie Soter executed

unconditional

guarantees, guaranteeing

the performance

of the

Promissory Note by Soterfs, Inc., Continental and Deseret Federal
are entitled to have and recover judgment

in their

favor and

against Gregory S. Soter and Julie Soter, jointly and severally,
in the amount of indebtedness set forth in paragraph 19 hereof.
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Tri-K is not entitled to any mechanicfs lien upon the

26.

subject property, and Tri-K's claim to establish and foreclose its
mechanic's lien should be dismissed with prejudice.
27.

United Pacific and Tri-K had the obligation and duty to

construct and complete the Camelot Condominium Project. As between
Deseret Federal and Soter's, Inc., on the one hand, and United
Pacific and Tri-K, on the other hand, Deseret Federal and Soter's,
Inc. had no obligation or duty to complete the construction to
mitigate their damages caused by United Pacific's and Tri-K's
failure to construct and complete the Camelot Condominium Project.
28.

Tri-K breached its Construction Contract, which had been

assigned to Deseret Federal, by failing to complete construction
of the Camelot Condominium Project on or before December 31, 1984,
and

by

unauthorizedly

withdrawing

profits

in the

amount of

$202,651.74.
29.

United Pacific breached its Performance Bond by failing

to complete the Construction Contract and by failing to remedy TriKfs breaches of the Construction Contract.
30.
December

Deseret Federal and Soter's, Inc. did not waive the
31, 1984 completion

date found

in the Construction

Contract.
31.

As a result of United Pacific's and Tri-K's breaches,

Deseret Federal has been damaged, and is entitled to a judgment
against United Pacific and Tri-K, jointly and severally, in the
amount of $2,215,919.00.
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32.

Inasmuch as Deseret Federal promised to pay Tri-K for

construction costs incurred for the Camelot Condominium Project
during January, February, March, and April 1985 and failed to make
such payments,

Deseret

Federal breached

such promise and is

estopped from denying its obligation to make such payment.

Tri-K

is entitled to a judgment against Deseret Federal in the amount of
$102,796.00.
33.

Deseret Federal did not defraud Tri-K and Tri-K1s fraud

claim against Deseret Federal should be dismissed with prejudice.
34. Deseret Federal did not defraud United Pacific and United
Pacific's fraud claim against Deseret Federal should be dismissed
with prejudice.
DATED this /£

day of ^S£SLS^C^>

1989.

JY THE COURT:

fH'E Wl<ORAlBLB-ER^EST F
I ^ t s t r i c t Court Judge
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1558 South 1100 East
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

SOTER'S INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

|
|

ORDER, JUDGMENT, AND
DECREE OF FORECLOSURE

jI
I

Civil No. 8560
(Judge Ernest Baldwin)

vs.
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Defendants,
SHERWIN KNUDSEN d/b/a
TRI-K GENERAL CONTRACTORS,

]
i

Plaintiff,

Case No. 8561
(Consolidated)

;

vs.
]

SOTER'S, INC., et al.
Defendants.

]

This matter came on regularly for trial before the Court on
May 11, 1988 until May 26, 1988, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin
presiding.

Soter*s, Inc. was represented by Lowell V. Summerhays;

Summit Park Company ("Summit Park"), Gregory S. Soter, and Julie
Soter

were represented

by

Savings and Loan Association

William

J.

Cayias; Deseret

Federal

("Deseret Federal") was represented

by Stephen G. Crockett and Gregory D. Phillips of and for the firm
of

Kimball,

Parr,

Crockett

and

Waddoups; Continental

Federal

Savings Bank ("Continental") was represented by Glen E. Davies of
and for the firm of Watkiss & Campbell; Sherwin Knudsen dba Tri-K

APPENDIX B

Construction Co. ("Tri-K") was represented by William R. Russell;
and United Pacific Insurance Co. ("United Pacific") was represented
by Robert W. Hughes. The Court having reviewed the Interrogatories
to the Jury, having reviewed the file herein, having heard the
arguments of counsel at hearings on June 27, 1988, July 15, 1988,
and September 21, 1988, including the parties' motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, and being now fully advised in the
premises, by virtue of the law, and good cause appearing therefor,
HEREBY ENTERS IT'S JUDGMENT AND DECREES as follows:
1.

That

the total

sum of

$3,969,427.03,

together

with

interest on the principal amount of $2,700,485.75 at the rate set
forth in the Soter's, Inc. Promissory Note from and after October
31, 1988, plus Continental's attorney's
amount

of $

Promissory

fees and costs in the

, is due under

Note, and secured by the Trust

the Soter's, Inc.
Deeds that are the

subject of this action which Trust Deeds were given by Soter's,
Inc. and Summit Park, Utah Corporations, as trustors, to Deseret
Federal as trustee and beneficiary.

The Trust Deed given by

Soter's, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the "Soter's Trust Deed")
was recorded in the office of the Summit County Recorder on April
23, 1984 as Entry 219486, in Book 297 at Page 381. The Trust Deed
given by Summit Park (hereinafter referred to as the "Summit Park
Trust

Deed") was recorded
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County

Recorder on April 23, 1984 as Entry No. 219487, in Book 297 at Page
401 and rerecorded in the office of the Summit County Recorder on
May 3, 1984 as Entry No. 219995, in Book 298 at Page 626.

The

entire amount thereof is presently due, and there exist no offsets
or defenses as would reduce said amount, except that Soter's, Inc.
may offset Deseret Federal's share of Deseret Federal's principal
and

interest

due under

the

Promissory

Note by $1,250,000.00,

together with interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of
this Order, Judgment, and Decree of Foreclosure. Deseret Federal's
portion of the principal and interest due under the Soter's, Inc.
Promissory Note through October 31, 1988 is $1,550,529.62.
2.

That it is adjudged and decreed that the Soter's Trust

Deed and the Summit Park Trust Deed, which cover the real property
described in Exhibits "A" and "B" attached hereto, are valid and
subsisting liens upon said real property securing the indebtedness
identified in paragraph 1 hereof, and that the interests of all
other parties in said real property are inferior and subordinate
to the liens of the Soter's Trust Deed and the Summit Park Trust
Deed.
3.

That Continental and Deseret Federal have judgment for

foreclosure on the Trust Deeds that are the subject of this action,
which Trust Deeds were given by Soter's, Inc. and Summit Park, and
that the parcels of real property described in Exhibits "A" and "B"
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hereto, which are covered by the Soter's Trust Deed and the Summit
Park Trust Deed, shall be sold to satisfy the indebtedness adjudged
in paragraph 1 hereof, together with accruing interest, and the
Sheriff of Summit County shall proceed to sell the same according
to the provisions of law relating to sales on execution.

When the

Sheriff

property

of

Summit

County

sells

the

parcels

of real

described in Exhibits "A" and "B,,f he shall out of the proceeds of
such sale first retain his costs, disbursements and commissions,
and then pay to Continental

and

Deseret Federal, or to their

attorneys, the accrued and accruing costs of this action, then said
sums for Continental's attorney's fees, then the amount owing to
Continental and Deseret Federal for principal, interest, costs and
expenses, taxes, assessments and insurance premiums, together with
accrued interest thereon, or so much of said sums as said proceeds
will pay, and that the surplus, if any, shall be accounted for and
paid over to the Clerk of this Court subject to this Court's
further order.
4.

That the interests,

if

any,

property described in Exhibits wA,f and

M

in the parcels of

real

B M hereto of all parties

herein except Continental and Deseret Federal, and all of those
claiming by, through or under any parties herein except Continental
and

Deseret

Federal,

and

all

persons

whose

interest

in said

property was not duly recorded in the proper office at the time of
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recording of the Soters Trust Deed and the Summit Park Trust Deed,
be and the same are hereby barred and foreclosed, subject to their
statutory rights of redemption, if any.
5.

That in the event that the proceeds of the sale of the

parcels of real property described in Exhibits "A" and

,f

B" hereto,

which are covered by the Soter1s Trust Deed and the Summit Park
Trust

Deed,

attorneys1

are

insufficient

to

satisfy

the

indebtedness,

fees, and other costs and expenses adjudged herein,

Continental and Deseret Federal are entitled to have and recover
judgment against Soter1s and Summit Park, jointly and severally,
in such amount necessary to satisfy the indebtedness.
6.

That Continental and Deseret Federal have judgment in

their favor and against Gregory S. Soter and Julie Soter, jointly
and severally, in the amount of indebtedness adjudged in paragraph
1 hereof subject to offset set forth in paragraph 1.
7.

That Deseret

Federal have judgment

in its favor and

against United Pacific and Tri-K, jointly and severally, in the
amount of $2,215,919.00, together with interest thereon at the
legal rate from the date of this Order, Judgment, and Decree of
Foreclosure.
8.

That Tri-K have judgment in its favor and against Deseret

Federal in the amount of $102,796.00 plus interest thereon at the
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legal rate from the date of this Order, Judgment, and Decree of
Foreclosure.
9.

All claims asserted herein by Tri-K to any lien or right

to lien upon the property described on Exhibit

f,

A" and/or "B"

hereto and all claims to any lien evidenced by that certain claim
and Notice of Lien executed by Tri-K and recorded in the office of
the Summit County Recorder on April 25, 1985 in Book 339 at Page
452 be and the same are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
10.

Soter's, Inc.'s and Tri-K's claims against Continental

predicated
Federal

upon

acted

the

alleged

as the agent

agency

relationship

of Continental

that

Deseret

in negotiating

the

Construction Loan Agreement or in funding the Construction Loan are
hereby dismissed with prejudice.
11.

Tri-K's claims against Continental predicated upon the

alleged agency relationship that Deseret Federal acted as the agent
of

Continental

in

inducing

Tri-K

to

remain

on

the

Camelot

Condominium Project after December 31, 1984 are hereby dismissed
with prejudice.
Soterfs,

X2.
contract

Inc's

claims against

and

Tri-K's

Continental

prejudice.
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third-party

beneficiary

are hereby dismissed

with

13.

Continental's

fraud claim against Soter's, Inc. and

conspiracy to defraud claims against Soter's, Inc. and Tri-K are
hereby dismissed with prejudice.
14.

Continental's Performance Bond claims against United

Pacific are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
15.

Continental's claims against Tri-K for breach of the

Construction Contract are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
16.

Deseret Federal's indemnity claim against Soter's, Inc.

under the Assignment

of Construction

Contract and Consent

are

hereby dismissed with prejudice.
17.

Soter's, Inc.'s claims for breach of implied covenant of

good faith and fair dealing against Deseret Federal are hereby
dismissed with prejudice.
18.

Summit Park's claims that Deseret Federal breached the

Revolving Line of Credit Agreement and converted money from Summit
Park are dismissed with prejudice.
19.

Tri-K's

fraud

claims

against

Deseret

Federal

are

dismissed with prejudice.
20. United Pacific's fraud claims against Deseret Federal are
dismissed with prejudice.
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JUDGMENT ENTERED this

District Judg
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